“E-mail Forensics: Eliminating Spam, Scams and Phishing"

Les Hatton
Professor of Forensic Software Engineering
SEC, Kingston University
Les.Hatton@kingston.ac.uk

Version 1.1: 25/Jan/2013
Types of email forensics

- **Investigative forensics**
  - Generally poring over immense logfiles trying to determine the provenance of an email

- **Preventative forensics**
  - Attempting to prevent future attacks by analysing their pathology

Both involve criminal activity, hence forensics.
Overview

- The basics: why bother
- The threat landscape

Defence in Depth

Wrap-up
My servers receive anywhere between 10,000 and 150,000 emails a day. 99.97% are junk.

30 scams and about 150 spam messages a month are good enough to make it into my operating theatre to be dissected for further analysis. Detection efficiency is currently 4 mistakes per million messages received.

BCS (January 2013) reports 20,000 malicious emails a month of which 5% are cyber attacks on UK government networks, (which means they are missing quite a few).
Christmas joy – my operating theatre

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Email Address</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
<th>Sent Date/Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tesco Voucher Lucifer</td>
<td>Tesco Personal Finance</td>
<td>05/11/12 14:22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[DANGER: SCAM]10.1</td>
<td>BELOVED</td>
<td>06/11/12 23:58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[DANGER: SCAM]8.1</td>
<td>Contract Deal</td>
<td>07/11/12 12:32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[DANGER: SCAM]4.6</td>
<td>Promotional Product</td>
<td>07/11/12 15:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[DANGER: SCAM]3.7</td>
<td>15% off Bags &amp; Cases</td>
<td>09/11/12 00:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[DANGER: SCAM]7.7</td>
<td>Member, I added the...</td>
<td>09/11/12 23:35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[DANGER: SCAM]7.6</td>
<td>Sub: Urgent &amp; Confide...</td>
<td>12/11/12 20:41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[DANGER: SCAM]6.9</td>
<td>Investment Assistance</td>
<td>13/11/12 16:34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[DANGER: SCAM]10.5</td>
<td>Congratulations Fro...</td>
<td>13/11/12 22:41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[DANGER: SCAM]10.9</td>
<td>Congratulations Fro...</td>
<td>14/11/12 12:27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[DANGER: SCAM]4.5</td>
<td>Your Amazon.co.uk S...</td>
<td>15/11/12 15:48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[DANGER: SCAM]6.7</td>
<td>REQUEST</td>
<td>17/11/12 17:14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[DANGER: SCAM]6.4</td>
<td>Tax Refund Notification</td>
<td>19/11/12 05:45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[DANGER: SCAM]7.7</td>
<td>Congratulations Che...</td>
<td>20/11/12 21:15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[DANGER: SCAM]9.9</td>
<td>Your account is limit...</td>
<td>21/11/12 08:59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[DANGER: SCAM]8.0</td>
<td>Winning No: MSP798...</td>
<td>23/11/12 13:24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[DANGER: SCAM]8.0</td>
<td>Winning No: MSP798...</td>
<td>23/11/12 13:25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[DANGER: SCAM]5.4</td>
<td>Partner Required.</td>
<td>26/11/12 04:45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[DANGER: SCAM]8.5</td>
<td>Winning No: MSP798...</td>
<td>26/11/12 11:35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[DANGER: SCAM]8.8</td>
<td>You have an importa...</td>
<td>27/11/12 07:58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[DANGER: SCAM]8.8</td>
<td>YOUR ATM PAYMENT ...</td>
<td>29/11/12 21:57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Where does it all come from?
(this week's top ten)

1. China
2. Iceland
3. USA
4. Russia
5. Israel
6. Germany
7. Indonesia
8. Australia
9. South Korea
10. Canada
The basics: how mail goes from
A \( \rightarrow \) B

A (MUA) \rightarrow Postfix \rightarrow Internet \rightarrow Postfix \rightarrow POP/IMAP \rightarrow B (MUA)

MTA

MDA
The basics: Headers and Content

Connect mail.receive.com (an MTA responds)
HELO mail.send.com (an MTA responds)
MAIL FROM: alice@send.com (an MTA responds)
RCPT TO: bob@receive.com (an MTA responds)
Date: ...
DATA (an MTA responds)
From: alice@send.com
To: bob@receive.com
Reply-To: ...
Message-ID: ...
Subject: ...
Blah blah blah

Disconnect
**The basics: Headers and Content**

**Connect** mail.receive.com (an MTA responds)
HELO mail.send.com (an MTA responds)
MAIL FROM: alice@send.com (an MTA responds)
RCPT TO: bob@receive.com (an MTA responds)
DATA (an MTA responds)
...

**Send MTA**

**Receive MTA**
Accept (loses HELO)

Reject or Discard via HELO, ...

Backscatter !Bounce via From:

*** Reject as early as possible ***
The basics: anybody can read it

- Nearly all e-mail is sent in clear as if you had written it on a postcard and asked a complete stranger to post it for you.
- It can be arbitrarily spoofed
The basics: what can be forged?

- Headers that can be forged
  - Subject, Date, Message-ID
  - Recipients: From, To, CC, BCC
  - Content body
  - Any arbitrary headers, X-Mailer …
  - All but the last Received header

- Headers that can **not** be forged
  - Last (top most) Received header
  - Originating mail server, specifically
    - IP address
    - Subsequent timestamps
The threat landscape – e-mail borne toxins

- Spam
  - Density
  - Works of Art
  - Harvesting
  - Patterns
- Scams
For a single mail-server handling mail for 8 domains in 12-19 November, 2012

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total received</td>
<td>64,764</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discarded</td>
<td>64,526</td>
<td>99.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejected by deep content</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0.066%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>filtering</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivered to users</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Missed spam / lost mail)</td>
<td>(0/0)</td>
<td>0.00/0.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The threat landscape – HTML works of art

```
<body>=09
<p>=09What's up?=a name=3D"tprw"></a></p><a name=3D"qpqr"></a><span name=3D"twqp">=09</span><a name=3D"rtwp"></a><table border=3D"6" cellspacing=3D"7" cellpadding=3D"1" width=3D"199">
<tr><td bordercolor=3D"#4B41CE" nowrap=3D"nowrap" valign=3D"baseline" bgcolor=3D"#D9F0BC"><strong>V</strong><font color=3D"#D9F0BC">b</font></td><td nowrap=3D"nowrap" valign=3D"middle" bordercolor=3D"#69FA49" bgcolor=3D"#BCB6F0" align=3D"center">I</td><td bordercolor=3D"#67DA87" valign=3D"baseline" bgcolor=3D"#F0BCC3" align=3D"left" nowrap=3D"nowrap">A</td><td align=3D"center" bgcolor=3D"#F0C3BC" bordercolor=3D"#0EE799">G</td><td nowrap=3D"nowrap" bgcolor=3D"#D4F0BC" bordercolor=3D"#68CD66" align=3D"left" nowrap=3D"nowrap">R</td><td align=3D"left" bordercolor=3D"#6852DC" valign=3D"top"<font color=3D"#F0B9BC">3</font></td></tr></table>=09<br><strong></strong><table><tr><td>WWW</td><td>.</td><td>NEVOB=</td><td>.</td><td>COM</td></tr></table><b>=09</b><br><strong>=09</strong><p></p><span name=3D"pprt">=09</span><p><a name=3D"qqtp"></a></p>
```

From: "Riso Nuzzi" <cohered@nda.co.nz>
To: gundalf@oakcomp.co.uk
Date: 2008-08-07 00:10

Spam Status: Spammassassin —

Heya,

V I A G R A

WWW . NEVOB . COM
The threat landscape – harvesting e-mails

- “New virus coming – warn 25 of your friends …”
- “New speed camera – pass on to your friends”
- A beauty from recently, (07-02-2012):- “Advice on not passing on to your friends” saying “pass on to your friends” at the bottom.
The threat landscape – spam patterns

- More of a nuisance than a danger
  - Word frequency and *Bayes theorem* remain very effective – e.g. sales words
  - SpamAssassin still effective, largely because many spammers are not very sophisticated.
Bayes theorem

Consider the appearance of the word “prize”

\[
P(\text{spam} | \text{prize}) = \frac{P(\text{prize} | \text{spam})P(\text{spam})}{P(\text{prize} | \text{spam})P(\text{spam}) + P(\text{prize} | \text{nonsspam})P(\text{nonsspam})}
\]

We train Bayesian filters on an existing population of spam and nonspam and then use the above to predict. Individual Bayesian filters can reach around 99.5% accuracy.
The threat landscape – e-mail borne toxins

- Spam
- Scams
  - Nature
  - Patterns
- Intrusions
The threat landscape – Nature of scams

- Scams can be much more of a challenge
  - Lotteries (easy)
  - “My left leg has been biten off by a mad cheetah and I have $4 million in da trouser leg” (Nigerian 419) (easy)
  - Phishing for account details (increasingly convincing)
  - Pharming, DNS hijacking, … (ditto)
The threat landscape – account hijacking attack

Came from compromised mailbox in KU. User does not exist.

From: address does not exist

Link -zyef.9hz.com does not exist
The threat landscape – friend in trouble scam

From: [redacted] <[redacted]@yahoo.co.uk>
Date: 21 January 2013 05:00:53 GMT
To: undisclosed recipients;
Subject: [redacted] /47.02//3.4/ Urgent Assistance
Reply-To: [redacted]@yahoo.co.uk

Hope you read this soon, I'm in Limassol, Cyprus and I lost my bag with passport and credit card. The embassy is willing to assist me fly back without my passport but I must pay for my ticket and hotel bills. Unfortunately I have no money left, my credit card would have helped, but it was also in the bag I lost. I have notified my bank but they need more time to give me a new credit card so for now my bank account as been blocked for security reason.
I wonder if you can lend me some money as soon as possible. I'll give you back as soon as I get back. But right now I definitely need to get on the next flight. Please contact me by e-mail, I lost my cell phone as well. I'm waiting for your reply. Thanks

Solution: Switch your email account to somebody else
(Try googling “Hacking yahoo mail accounts”).
The threat landscape
- supplier scams, Jan 2013

Dear Amazon Customer,

We have recently determined that various computers connect to your Amazon account, password, and the present of chess more talent before the connection. Now we need to confirm the new information from your Amazon account. If not completed within 48 hours, we will be forced to suspend your account indefinitely, because it can be used in a fraudulent intent. Thank you for your comprehension in this way. To confirm your online account:

>> Click here.

Link points to http://222.66.64.165:5800/uk.html

Link in Shanghai
The threat landscape - lottery scams, Jan 2013

From: EUROMILLIONS LOTTERY PROMOTION <Euro.Promotion11212@vesta.ocn.ne.jp>
Subject: /19.69/[DANGER: SCAM]/12.5/ ....Winning Notice....
Reply to: myer_carolyn2@e-mail.ua
To: undisclosed-recipients:
Message-ID: <20130124131940.A3CAD4AC47D@mv-osn-hkg001.ocn.ad.jp>
Return-Path: <Euro.Promotion11212@vesta.ocn.ne.jp>

EUROMILLIONS LOTTERY PROMOTION
ONLINE LOTTERY DEPARTMENT
AVDA. SAN JUAN 3,
28045 MADRID-SPAIN.

Winning Notice

We are happy to inform you about the result of the just concluded monthly final draws of the EuroMillions lottery.

Your email was among the 20 Lucky winners who won 2,100,000 Euros (Two Million One Hundred Thousand Euros) in the EuroMillions Online Lottery Draw dated Monday 14th Day of January 2013.

Following the results, your email is attached to Ticket Number (343-221-8756), Ballot Serial Number (454-17) (06) among others. Your Lucky Star Numbers falls within our Fiduciary Agent in Madrid-Spain and for your security, keep your winning details private until your claim is processed and your prize money successfully remitted.

To claim your prize money, kindly fill the form below and forward it to our Fiduciary Agent for final verification.

Directly to the paying bank where a cheque of 2,100,000 Euros (Two Million One Hundred Thousand Euros) is written and deposited in your name.

Your full name: ........................................
Age: ........................................
Gender: .................................
The threat landscape
- financial scams, Jan 2013

Based in London

Link points to http://freco.com/log/wonga/index.html

Domain (202.78.200.175) registered in Jakarta
The threat landscape
- bank scams, Oct 2012

Important account notification!
Dear Customer,

We are currently engaged in account maintenance service. As a Customer, you are required to verify your account information. Failure to verify your account information will lead to service suspension.

Log in to My account

Thank you.
Customer Service
Santander Bank Uk.

Link points to http://unisonlubricant.com/skin/frontend... Domain in India, hosted on server in Los Angeles
The threat landscape – scam patterns

- Need to recognise structure
  - Word frequency sometimes useful – e.g. “codicil”
  - Recognition of phases better
    - The tease (419) or threat (account hacking)
    - The link to contact, (always bogus)
    - The sign-off

- Link hoovering
The threat landscape – mitigating the attacks

- Use an Internet Service Provider which is reasonable at filtering junk. Most are not.
- NEVER give details away in an email. No responsible company would ever ask.
- Do not click on links in emails
- Turn HTML rendering off in your mail program
- Configure your browser not to download remote content, (starve toxic mailers from any feedback)
Overview

- Overview
  - The basics: why bother
  - The threat landscape
- Defence in Depth
- Wrap-up
Architectures

The filter pipeline

Postfix MTA

Serial filters

Must be *individually* very accurate

Parallel filters

Must be *collectively* very accurate

Internet

Voter

MUA
Defence in depth

- **Serial filters**
  - Must be 100% accurate, for example,
    - self-helo – MTAs pretending to be mine – one of 1,810 since Monday
    - daft addresses – gretchenlambbutch@oakcomp.co.uk, one of 15,181 received since Monday.

- **Parallel filters**
  - Will be less than 100% accurate but they only vote.
  - RBL, e-mail received trajectory, contact pattern, link hoovering, word / phrase / sequence content filtering and the Reverend Thomas Bayes.
Summary of last 120 weeks
Viral penetration: evidence of increasing sophistication

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Viruses hitting virus filters per month*</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Note**
  - No viruses have reached an end user since 2010 – they always have something else wrong with them.
  - Recent increase started in October 2011.
  - Latest all claim to be from Santander, Barclays and recently Paypal and HMRC
Viral penetration

The filter pipeline

Internet

Serial filters

Parallel filters

Voter

MUA

Viruses lost here until Oct 2011

Viruses lost here after Oct 2011
Overview

- Overview
- Defence in Depth
- Wrap-up
Some legislation currently makes things potentially much worse

- Freedom of Information Act (2000). The Data Protection Act (1998) does not give you immunity from having to release e-mail addresses as a public body.

- Use section 36 of the FOIA instead.
It is possible to detect and remove nearly all toxic email - 99.9996% accuracy.

Much of the really unsophisticated junk has disappeared.

Some scamming attacks are getting very sophisticated and are a bigger percentage of all junk.

Viruses almost always have something else wrong with them allowing early rejection, (so far).

It remains an arms race with continuous evolution of attack and defence.
References

Loads of stuff on Wikipedia:-
http://www.wikipedia.org/

My writing site:-
http://www.leshatton.org/